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Abstract 
Latin America as a region has been a meeting point between Brazil and the EU. Brazil uses the region, 
mainly South America, as a platform to increase its weight in the international arena, and as a means 
to strengthen its trade and economic development. Meanwhile, the EU has projected its model of 
integration in this region with the intention of finding stable and similar partners with whom to close 
partnership agreements, with the wider goal of contributing to a regionally-organized multilateral 
system. 
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Resumen 
América Latina como región ha sido un punto de encuentro entre Brasil y la UE. Brasil utiliza la 
región, principalmente de América del Sur, como una plataforma para aumentar su peso en la escena 
internacional, y como un medio para fortalecer su desarrollo comercial y económico. Mientras tanto, 
la UE ha proyectado su modelo de integración en esta región con la intención de encontrar aliados 
estables y similares para cerrar acuerdos de colaboración, con el objetivo más amplio de contribuir a 
un sistema multilateral regional organizado. 
Palabras clave: Brasil. Unión Europea. Regionalismo. BRIC’s. Cooperación para el desarrollo. 
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BRAZIL AND THE EU IN THE SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL SCENARIO: INSIGHTS ON 
REGIONALISM, THE ROLE OF THE BRICS, AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
Introduction 
Latin America as a region has been a meeting point between Brazil and the EU. Brazil uses 
the region, mainly South America, as a platform to increase its weight in the international arena, and 
as a means to strengthen its trade and economic development. Meanwhile, the EU has projected its 
model of integration in this region with the intention of finding stable and similar partners with whom 
to close partnership agreements, with the wider goal of contributing to a regionally-organized 
multilateral system. 
The EU’s campaign to promote the integration of LA goes back to the 1990’s, when the economic 
and political context was completely different from that of today. At that time, the dominant type of 
integration was “open regionalism,” aimed at creating a customs union as a way for the bloc to gain 
weight in international economic negotiations (Gomes Saraiva, 2012). MERCOSUR and CAN 
corresponded to open regionalism, which is classified in the literature as pertaining to a negative 
agenda of integration, prioritizing only economic, rather than political interests.  
For Brazil’s diplomats, MERCOSUR accomplishes economic objectives, linked to development and 
the widening of its market and political objectives, with respect to the search for power and leadership 
in the region before the US (Bernal-Meza, 2008).  
Under Lula’s government, MERCOSUR was again among the major priorities of Brazil’s agenda, 
once the integration process had overcome serious difficulties provoked mainly by the economic 
crises of Brazil and Argentina in 1999 and 2001, respectively.  
In general, South America was in the spotlight of Brazil’s FP. According to Matias Spektor, behind 
Lula’s reorientation towards the region, there were above all material incentives, rather than an idea 
of a common regional identity. These incentives were the control of inflation, the regionalization of 
Brazil’s economy and the resultant interdependence, and the US’ progressive distancing from the 
region (2011). 
Contrary to what it is widely thought, the notion that South America is the natural geographic location 
of Brazil comes from a marketing strategy to differentiate Brazil from Mexico. Brazil needed to gain 
confidence in the international system to obtain credit from the IMF, given that Mexico had 
announced that would not pay back its debts to the IMF. Later, the concept “South America” would 
have a strategic meaning for Brazil’s interpretations of the world system (Spektor, 2011). 
Nevertheless, Lula’s reorientation to the region would not only follow the economically-focused 
integration of the 1990s. During the first decade of the 21st century, the process of integration in the 
region acquired a different look, shifting from a negative agenda, based on a customs union, to a 
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positive one, centered on political aims. This so-called “post-liberal regionalism,” coexists with the 
open regionalism which is now more flexible. 
As Sanahuja synthesizes, the common aspects of the new tendency of integration are: a) return of 
politics to the bosom of foreign relations and cooperation policy; b) less attention to the trade and 
economic agenda; c) return to the development agenda (post-Washington consensus); d) return of 
the state to politics, particularly regarding economic and social development, and foreign policy; e) 
search of autonomy from markets, regarding development policy, and from the US and other external 
actors, regarding foreign policy; f) emphasis on the positive agenda of integration, focusing on the 
creation of institutions and common policies, and on a more intensive cooperation in non-
commercial areas, which has resulted in the widening of SSC mechanisms; g) greater preoccupation 
with social asymmetries and with the likely link between regional integration and poverty reduction 
and inequality; h) greater preoccupation with “bottlenecks” and weak regional infrastructures with 
the aims of improving the articulation of regional markets and facilitating access to external markets; 
i) more emphasis in energy security and the search for complementarities in this field; and j) major 
participation of non-state actors and social legitimacy of integration process (Sanahuja Perales, 2011). 
UNASUR, ALBA,1 or the most recent CELAC are process of integration that fit in this kind of post-
liberal regionalism. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, Spanish acronym), Hugo 
Chávez’s project, differs from the other two as it basically “perceives the integration as an anti-liberal 
and anti-US instrument, and supports the idea of deepening the revolutionary process of “Socialism 
of the 21st century.”2 In Gomes Saraiva’s words, “the economic dimension has been subordinated to 
the political to the point that the economic integration is now considered an expression of “wild neo-
liberalism,” accused of being responsible for growing extra-regional dependence(Gomes Saraiva, 
2012). 
UNASUR could be considered more an instrument of regional governance or cooperation among 
the twelve member states from South America – Bolivia, Equator, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Guyana, and Surinam – than a classic integration project 
(Gomes Saraiva, 2012). Its origin dates back to Cardoso’s initiative launched in 2000,the Initiative for 
the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), or a plan to link South 
America's economies through new infrastructure, transportation, energy, and telecommunications 
projects (De Almeida, 2012).  
1 ALBA’smembernations are Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint 
Vincent and theGrenadines, and Venezuela. 
2 It is a concept coined by Heinz DieterichSteffan in his 1996 book with the same title, in which he proposes a 
revolutionary socialism based on Marxist ideas. The aim would be a radical strengthening of state power, 
controlled democratically by society to reach development. Hugo Chávez spread the concept worldwide by 
using it in his speech at the 5th World Social Forum in 2005.  
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In 2004, Lula gave a boost to IIRSA by proposing the creation of the South American Community 
of Nations, or Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones (CSN), a political project whose agenda includes a 
wide variety of issues, such as political dialogue, physical integration, environment, energetic 
integration, South American financial mechanisms, or the promotion of social cohesion. In 2008, 
CASA took a different name, UNASUR, as suggested by the president of Venezuela in an attempt to 
foster his leadership in the region. 
Although the organization has a complex institutional design, composed by the Council of Heads of 
State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of Delegates, and a 
General Secretary, in practice, its intergovernmental logic hampers true integration beyond a close 
cooperation. In economic terms, it does not have any economic compromises nor fits in any kind of 
economic integration, so it is complementary to the existent CAN, MERCOSUR, or even ALBA 
(Gomes Saraiva, 2012).  
In strategic terms, in 2008 UNASUR’s member states created the South America Council of Defense, 
proposed by Lula, aimed to coordinate the region’s defense policies. It is neither a military alliance, 
nor a defensive organization, given that it does not have a mutual defense clause (Sanahuja Perales, 
2011). Its goals are to consolidate South America as an area of peace, free of nuclear and mass 
destruction weapons; to build an identity of South American defense; and to generate consensus to 
strengthen the regional cooperation in defense issues (Statute of South American Council of 
Defense).  
Finally, two years later, the whole region, including Cuba, reached an agreement to create a new 
mechanism of coordination, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Countries or CELAC 
– heir of Rio Group and the Latin America and Caribbean Summit (CALC) on Integration and 
Development.3 The fact that Canada and the US were left aside led some authors to interpret CELAC 
as an “expression of anti-Americanism or even a political move to supplant the OAS” (Shifter, 2012). 
Apart from the rhetoric of Latin America’s liberalization, autonomy, and independence (De Almeida, 
2012), CELAC should rather be “understood as an attempt to narrow political chasms and reconcile 
disparate actors within the region itself ” (Shifter, 2012). 
In light of the continual creation of overlapping organizations, many academics and politicians reduce 
the importance of this new regionalism, which is considered an exercise of rhetoric that has severe 
limitations as it lacks a rigid institutionalization (Da Motta Veiga & Rios, 2011). Although UNASUR 
3 The Rio Group arose in 1986 as an alternative body to the Organization of American States. CALC on 
Integration and Development was held for the same time in Bahía, Brazil, in 2008. It was created with the 
purpose of advancing the articulation of integration processes and of fostering and strengthening the 
development of ALC countries. 
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seems to be an innovative proposal, it would have to confront the same problems that have plagued 
MERCOSUR and CAN (Mellado, 2010). 
In fact, UNASUR’s intergovernmental nature reflects Brazil’s – and the rest of the region’s – lack of 
willingness to deepen the integration of Latin America. Rather, Brazil sees UNASUR as a forum in 
which to smooth over differences with its neighbors (Shifter, 2012); and CELAC, as a platform to 
coordinate regional participation in international and hemispheric fora, and coordinate with the 
spaces of political, economic, social, and security integration existing in the region (Murillo Zamora, 
2011). However, it is not clear to what extent regional leadership helps emerging countries in their 
global aspirations. According to Esther Barbé, “regional context is for emerging countries an 
enhancer of their global roles (representation) as well as a structural weakness (suspicion, territorial 
conflicts)” (2010). 
The truth is that Latin America as a bloc is still far from becoming a reality. As Sanahuja observes, 
“Latin America faces a permanent “trilemma,” among the nation-state and the defense of sovereignty, 
the aspirations of an efficient regional integration, and the search for autonomy in the international 
sphere” (Sanahuja Perales, 2011). In addition, South America is fragmented, asymmetric, and 
governed by political regimes too disparate – socialist, populist, and conservative. Despite being a 
relatively peaceful region, there are conflicts and controversies still ongoing: Argentina and Uruguay 
over the paper mill; Argentina and Chile over gas; Uruguay and MERCOSUR over the Treaty of 
Investments, and the asymmetries of Uruguay’s position within the organization; Bolivia and Brazil 
over the price of the gas and the nationalization of hydrocarbon; Bolivia and Chile over the exit to 
the sea; and Paraguay and Brazil over the hydroelectric company Itaipú’s debt to Brazil, among others 
(Mellado, 2010).  
In terms of foreign policy, UNASUR’s members do not share a common position regarding their 
international insertion, multilateralism, or their relations with the US and the EU; while some states, 
such as Mexico or Chile, have signed FTA with both powers, others harshly reject any rapprochement 
to the Northern neighbor. Regarding the EU, the European Commission has always been responsible 
for designing the inter-regional agenda and the model of relations, given that LA countries do not 
share a common and unique strategy to approach the EU(Del Arenal Moyúa, 2009), apart from the 
common demand for the EU to open its agriculture market (Malamud, 2010). 
The EU is aware that Brazil’s leadership will mark the future of the region’s integration and 
multilateralism. In this sense, the Commission has recognized Brazil’s role as a mediator in the region, 
as stated in the communication “Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership.” Likewise, Brussels 
has already proposed, in several declarations and communications, to open a dialogue with UNASUR.  
However, several factors make it difficult to articulate a new model of relations with the region that 
will satisfy both sides in the short term: a) LA is not a region in social, economic, or political crisis, 
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as the Maghreb is; b) LA is still an ideological, political, and economic amalgam; c) to a certain extent, 
the region would work together as a shield to protect themselves against the possible negative impacts 
of the European crisis; d) the new cycle of integration is still ongoing, and how it will develop is 
undefined and uncertain; and e) the EU’s cooperation toward the region may possibly be drastically 
reduced.  
In this context, the EU looks at the new regionalism with attention and caution. So far it maintains 
its bilateral and bi-regional strategy of FTAs towards the region, but this liberal and unclear strategy 
seems outdated. The EU should take advantage of its privileged dialogue with Brazil to understand 
the priorities of the contemporaneous regionalism. For example, UNASUR’s agenda could be a good 
instrument to choose the areas of cooperation between the regions. Given that EU’s desire is to close 
SPs that include commercial agreements, Brussels will also benefit from a major physical integration 
or social cohesion, which are two of the UNASUR’s objectives. 
Brazil in the BRICS. Implications for Europe 
A magician from Wall Street invents something that ends up being incorporated by the 
same governments that want to defy the hegemony of capitalism, which has Wall Street 
as its most exuberant shop window. 
Clovis Rossi4 
When Brazil and the EU signed the SP in 2007, the concept “BRIC” already existed. 
However, since then something has changed: the economic concept, coined in 2001 by Jim O’Neil, 
a global economist of Goldman Sachs, also became a diplomatic-political reality in 2009.  
Back in 2001, in the report “Building Better Global Economic BRICs,” Jim O’Neil appointed, under 
the acronym BRIC, four emerging countries that would invert the financial international order in the 
next ten years: Brazil, Russia, India and China. Seeing their rapid growth, two years later, he 
completed a second study, “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050,” indicating new economic 
projections for 2050. Since then, new reports from different financial services have updated those 
projections. According to the 2007 Goldman report, “BRICs and Beyond,” the BRICS are expected to 
“account for close to 40 per cent of global GDP by 2050 and to have become four of the world’s 
top five economies” (Keohane, 2011). 
4Author’s own translation: “Un mago de Wall Street inventa algo que acaba incorporado até pelos governos que querem 
desafiar a hegemonia del capitalismo que tem Wall Street como sua vitrina mais exuberante”. 
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Figure 1
 
Without looking to 2050, current and recent figures already show the increasing weight of their 
economies in the international system. According to the Bank of Spain, since 2000 the BRICs have 
been the emerging countries to grow the most: its GDP increased at an average rhythm of 7.9% 
between 2000 and 2010. This acceleration is due to the increase of the rhythm of Brazil’s activity 
(from 2.3% in 1980-1999 to 3.7% in 2000-2010), and especially of India’s (5.5%, 7.1% respectively 
in such periods), as well as the high rhythm of China’s growth from the 1980’s (average of 10%) 
(Orgaz, Molina, & Carrasco, 2011). 
Their comprisal of the world GDP has also increased, passing from 12.2% of the world GDP in 1980 
to 29.2% expected in 2015 (Orgaz et al., 2011). However, these figures hide differences between the 
members: while China grew at 10.6% on average between 2004 and 2008, Brazil grew at 2.9% (Orgaz 
et al., 2011). Following the same trend, the BBVA report also shows the importance of China in the 
rate of BRIC’s growth since the beginning of the crisis in 2007(2012): 
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Table 1 
 2007 2008 2008 2010 2011 
BRIC 11.1 7.1 4,0 9.3 7.6 
BRIC without 
China 
8.3 5.1 -0,5 7.6 5.5 
Source: Luis Orgaz 
This economic growth, mainly from China, has already had repercussions in economic and political 
governance. To start with, acronym, originally of economic nature, has become a political forum, first 
as meetings between representatives of the four countries during the last sessions of the UNGA, and 
later as official summits. The institutionalization of meetings between the four countries was 
promoted by Brazil’s president, Lula da Silva, in his attempt to reinforce Brazil’s autonomy 
internationally. 
The first meeting removed from the context of UN took place in 2008 in Ekaterimburgo, Russia, 
and was held by the ministers of foreign affairs. The next year, the meeting occurred in the same 
location, but with the heads of State and Government, and it was considered the first official summit. 
The following were also held by the heads of State and Governments: the second summit was in 
Brasilia, Brazil, in 2010; the third in Sanya, China, in 2011; and the last one was held in New Delhi, 
India, in 2012 (Santos Viera de Jesús, 2012). 
In addition, since November 2010, BRIC has welcomed a new member, South Africa, which adds an 
“S” to the acronym, resulting in BRICS. Therefore, the African continent also has its say in this 
informal forum which attempts to counterbalance Western power (Corvalán, Del Barco, & Del 
Barco, 2011).5 
Apart from their large economic, geographic surfaces, populations and reserve currencies, the logic 
that gathers such different countries is –– their willingness to alter the current equilibrium of power, 
in which the US and the European countries have exerted the leadership thanks to their 
overrepresentation in international institutions, such as the UN or the IMF.  
More specifically, they champion the following objectives. In the first place, they defend a multi-polar 
world order in which UN has a central role (Orgaz et al., 2011). For that reason, China and Russia 
support Brazil and India’s campaign to obtain a permanent seat in the Security Council. In exchange, 
5 South Africa was already part of IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa), considered a more appropriate platform 
for its development, since the members are more like-minded and the group is more consolidated.  
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Brazil recognizes China as a market economy (Gratius, 2012), a status that the EU and the US are 
reluctant to grant China.  
Secondly, they defend new economic governance, asking for the definitive substitution of the G-7 
for the G-20, and for the reform of the IMF and the WB. In those institutions, the BRIC countries 
represent 13.5% and 12.3%, respectively, in 2010 although their weight in the world GDP was greater, 
both in purchasing power parity (PPP) (24.55%) and in constant dollars (17.2%) (Orgaz et al., 2011). 
For its part, Brazil represented in 2010 the 2.9% of the world GDP in PPP and 3.3% in constant 
dollars, while its power accounted for 2.2% within the IMF and for 2.1% within the WB. The EU 
instead was overrepresented, given that its participation in the world GDP actually amounted to 
20.6% in PPP, and 26% in dollars, both figures lower than its representation in the IMF (29.4%) and 
in the WB (26.3%) (Orgaz et al., 2011, p. 35).Negotiations to revise the power shares within the IMF 
and the WB, as well in other multilateral organizations, are very complex because the profits of 
emerging countries signify the loss of developed countries, or in other terms, it is a zero-sum game 
(Orgaz et al., 2011, p. 36). 
Recently, emerging countries have achieved an increase in their power shares. Still waiting for the 
ratification of this revision of shares, the BRIC will see an increase in their representation within the 
WB of 2 percentage points (pp), and within the IMF of 3.8 pp, specifically Brazil will gain 1 pp within 
the WB and 8 pp within the IMF. Consequently, the four countries will rank among the first ten 
countries in terms of power share (Orgaz et al., 2011, p. 36). Most of these revisions took place within 
the G-20 meetings, which reveals that this new forum has institutionalized the emergent countries’ 
presence in the governance fora.  
Other demands affect the composition of the directorates of both institutions, in which the 
developed countries occupy between 12 and 14 seats out of a total of 24 directors, with eight or nine, 
depending on the rotation turns, pertaining to the European countries. In the G-20 meeting held in 
Korea, the emerging countries were able to achieve two new seats at the expense of the developed 
European countries (Orgaz et al., 2011, p. 37). 
Similarly, the BRIC have been concerned about the nomination of the Managing Director of the IMF 
and the president of the WB, two positions that have traditionally been reserved for a European and 
for a US citizen, respectively, although their statutes state that these positions should be elected by 
simple majority of the directorate members (Flemes, 2010). 
Thirdly, another issue in the BRIC agenda is a more stable, foreseeable, and diversified monetary 
system. Brazil has been behind the campaign to reduce the dependence on the dollar, although it is 
not favorable for China. As Flemes observes, the four countries have “currencies which have been 
historically unstable or not easily convertible, and in addition, China’s great dependence on its exports 
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and its enormous possession of assets in dollars produce an interest in maintaining the status quo” 
(2010). In addition, Brazil criticizes the currency war provoked by a depreciated Yuan.  
Clashes like this among the BRIC members show the limits of this political forum. It has been widely 
pointed out that the disparities among the members hamper major results in their campaign to 
reshape the international system. To a certain extent, BRIC is still an economic acronym which 
gathers two democracies, one authoritarian regime, and a dictatorship of a singular party. Catholicism, 
Hinduism, Confucianism, and Orthodox Christianity form their cultural and religious spectrum. 
Brazil does not have nuclear weapons, unlike the other three. Brazil and Russia claims for a major 
liberalization in agriculture, while India and China are more protectionists (Argumosa, 2012). The 
four have their own interests in assuming a major role in the international system, in opening their 
foreign markets and developing their economies, and even handling climate change. In this sense, the 
Brazilian newspaper Estado de São Paulo reported that China’s project includes the conquest of Latin 
American and African markets, displacing also Brazil” (Gallego-Díaz, 2010). 
A good example of this relative cohesion among the four emerging countries is that they did not 
agree on a candidate to substitute Robert Zoellick as the head of the WB, nor Strauss Khan at the 
IMF. Brazil, Russia, India, and China criticize the global financial institutions, led by an American 
and a European; yet, as Clovis Rossi reflects, they did not support the emergent candidate, the 
Mexican Agustín Cartens. Some analysts, such as Rossi, even say that “apart from defying the 
privileged position of the North Community, the BRIC do not have more common interests” (Rossi, 
2012). 
Along with the different characteristics of these countries, the high flexibility of the BRIC forum, its 
high informality, and its low institutionalization contribute to its limited influence in the global arena. 
Despites all these weakness of the forum, BRIC countries still represent a challenge for the EU and 
US, since in order to consolidate their autonomy, they develop an alternative agenda, above all when 
voting with UN. For instance, Brazil, India and South Africa abstained from voting sanctions against 
Syria, while China and Russia vetoed the European countries’ resolution. Similarly, BRIC members 
criticized EU and US’ intervention in Libya claiming that the intervention would have surpassed the 
Security Council mandate, which covered the protection of civilians.6 
This attitude responds to the so-called strategy of soft balancing. Unlike the strategy of 
bandwagoning, through which the emerging countries pragmatically adapt to the policies of the US 
and the EU in the international arenas, the soft balancing consists of “acting within the international 
6 Examples gathered by Santos Vieira de Jesus, Diego. Op.cit. 
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institutions eroding the power of the US, questioning its legitimacy, defying its preferences, or 
denying the necessary cooperation to make its aims possible” (Barbé Izuel, 2010).7 
In short, while the EU turns to the strategic partners to face a more interdependent international 
system and install an effective multilateralism, Brazil turns to alternative alliance with emerging 
countries, namely BRICs, along with regional integration process aforementioned. 
An agenda for change on development and cooperation 
The fact that there are many emerging or re-emerging actors creates new challenges with 
respect to issues of donor proliferation, coordination, specialization of tasks and the 
evolution of existing institutions of donor collaboration and coordination (Grimm, 
Humphrey, Lundsgaarde, & De Sousa, 2009, p. 7). 
The EU is the biggest aid donor in the world; the European Commission’s and the member 
states’ cooperation aid account for “50% of the world aid, with 53.8 billion” euro provided in the 
midst of the economic crisis in 2011(MercoPress, 2011). Development policy is one of the key soft 
power (Nye, 1990) elements that give the EU international recognition. However, the great efforts 
that the EU makes to support developing countries have not translated into a corresponding level of 
global prestige (Jara Roncati, 2011). For instance, according to the 2010 Latinobarometro report, 
Brazilian people give the US an assessment of 73 points out of 100, eleven points more than they 
give to the EU; and when asked about Brazil’s good bilateral relations with the US and the EU, 
Brazilians give Washington a score of 85, and Brussels, 68 (2010, pp. 8-18). 
The European Union knows that the impact of its development policy must be increased. For that 
reason, the European Commission released in 2011 the so called “Agenda for change”. It responded 
to EU’s lack of  international visibility, specifically within a new international context, marked by the 
economic crisis, the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Arab Spring, and the emergency of 
new donors, among them Brazil. 
Starting from the legal framework, the Treaty of Lisbon has firmly anchored development policy 
within EU external action, whereas previously, it had been under the exclusive purview of the 
European Commission. A clear example of the new link between development policy and foreign 
policy is that the old EC offices in third countries, which are in charge of implementing the 
development aid, have become EU embassies which pertain to the EEAS, led by the HR.  
7 Barbé, Esther. Op.cit. Author’s own translation: “comporta que las potencias emergentes actúen en las 
instituciones multilaterales como erosionadoras de poder de Estados Unidos, poniendo en duda su legitimidad, 
desafiando sus preferencias o negándole la cooperación necesaria para hacer posible la realización de sus 
objetivos.” 
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This mix between solidarity and interests seems contrary to OECD Development Assistance 
Committee consensus, also known as the Western Consensus on Development, which is based on 
conditionality – particularly on human rights, democracy, good governance, and the battle against 
corruption – and the delinking of development cooperation issues from broader foreign policy and 
security concerns. 
According to Humphrey, “[c]learly, decisions about aid are influenced by a range of EU interests, 
including stabilization of the Eastern European neighborhood, Mediterranean integrations, and 
relations with Turkey” (2010, p. 6). The enlargement to the East greatly contributed to the designation 
of the whole neighborhood as the EU’s main priority, along with the Arab countries in the Maghreb 
after the ongoing revolutions since 2010. 
In Article 208(1), the Treaty of Lisbon states that the EU’s main cooperation objective is still the 
diminishing and eradication of poverty. Consequently, the EU must take into account this aim when 
implementing other policies that could affect developing countries. For example, policies such as the 
CAP, one of the main obstacles to closing a free trade agreement between MERCOSUR and the EU, 
or eventually between Brazil and the EU, will be made to disappear from within the legal basis of the 
Union.  
More intensely than the new Treaty, the international economic crisis, which has affected Europe the 
most, is provoking the reshaping of the EU donor’s role. The two main consequences of the crisis 
are the fall of the budget dedicated to cooperation – or at least, the need to spend the funds more 
efficiently – and, as a result, increased room left to the emergent donors from the South.  
In this context, the European Commission (EC) presented the aforementioned “Agenda for change: 
Increasing the impact of EU development”, whose main purpose calls for the EU to “seek to target 
its resources where they are needed most to address poverty reduction and where they could have 
greatest impact” (European Commission, 2011a). Accordingly, the Commission proposes to 
differentiate between developing countries, taking into account that “several partner countries have 
become donors in their own right, while others are facing increasing fragility.” 
The idea is to concentrate aid in a reduced number of countries, mainly the poorest from Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the EU’s neighborhood; and in sectors that back democracy, human rights, and good 
governance, and that generate inclusive and sustainable growth. 
Based on the Agenda for Change, the Commission adopted two budget proposals related to 
instruments of foreign policy for the period 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2011b/c). As a 
consequence, countries that can produce enough resources to guarantee their own development, such 
as Brazil, would not receive bilateral subventions; however they could benefit from a new instrument 
called “Instrument for Partnership” (IP).  
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The PI replaces the “Financing Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialized and other High 
Income Countries and Territories” (ICI), which has been in force since 2007 and is due to expire by 
the end of 2013. In light of its specific objectives centered on advancing and promoting EU and 
mutual interests, the new instrument cannot be considered an instrument for cooperation, but a tool 
of foreign policy. The Partnership Instrument would seek to: 
● [implement] the international dimension of the “Europe 2020”8 strategy by supporting 
EU bilateral, regional and inter-regional cooperation partnership strategies, by 
promoting policy dialogues and by developing collective approaches and responses to 
challenges of global concern such as energy security, climate change and environment; 
● [improving] market access and developing trade, investment and business opportunities 
for European companies, in particular SMEs, by means of economic partnerships and 
business, and regulatory cooperation; 
● [enhancing] widespread understanding and visibility of the Union and its role on the 
world scene by means of public diplomacy, education/academic cooperation and 
outreach activities to promote Union’s values and interests (European Commission, 
2011b, p. 3).  
Apart from the PI, Brazil would still obtain funds through thematic programs.9 The EC would 
complement this new approach with different innovative kinds of cooperation, such as combinations 
of subventions and loans, mainly from the European Investment Bank (EIB). 
Along with Brazil, 16 other countries that fall under the category of upper middle income country 
(UMIC) – Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Equator, Rajasthan, Iran, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Thailand, Uruguay, and Venezuela – and two big countries of 
medium-low income with a GDP greater than 1% of the world GDP – India and Indonesia – will 
not receive any more bilateral aid. In fact, the EU considers China, Brazil, and India as partners with 
whom it can combat global challenges, rather than merely developing countries (Europeaid News, 
2011). 
This new Partnership Instrument would account for €1.1 billion while the Instrument of Cooperation 
for Development, targeted to the poorest countries, would be provided with funds to €23 billion, no 
8 In the “Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,” the Union has reiterated its 
sustained commitment to promote in its external policies smart, inclusive, and sustainable growth bringing 
together three pillars: economic, social, and environmental. 
9 The specific areas of cooperation for LA, or geographic programs, are social cohesion, governance and policy 
reforms, regional integration and interconnection of network infrastructures, the security-development nexus, 
high education, and economic vulnerability. The thematic programs pertain to the following areas: environment 
and climate change, sustainable energy, human development, food security and sustainable agriculture, and 
migration and asylum. 
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doubt a budget difference that would have a large impact on the ongoing cooperation programs 
between the EU and Brazil.  
Currently, Brazil receives EU aid mainly through the Regional Strategic Paper which establishes the 
cooperation between the EU and MERCOSUR and the Country Strategic Partnership (CSP), both 
for the period 2007-2013, in addition to the thematic and geographic programs implemented by 
Europe Aid10 in the whole LA region. 
The CSP 2007-2013 provides €61 million under the financing instrument for development 
cooperation (DCI) in two priority areas: 
→ Enhancing bilateral relations: this aims to support initiatives in the framework of EU-
Brazil sector dialogue, enhance social inclusion and achieve greater equality in Brazil. It 
also aims to meet other development challenges as well as foster academic exchanges by 
providing a means to fund Brazilian university student scholarships and staff exchanges, 
thereby promoting capacity-building for universities. In addition, it covers the 
establishment of a European Studies Institute in Brazil; 
→ Promoting the environmental dimension of sustainable development: EU cooperation 
is aimed at helping to achieve Millennium Development Goals in Brazil (e.g. MDG 
targets for ‘Goal 7 – Ensuring Environmental Sustainability’, including curbing 
deforestation in the Amazon region and in other biomes). Another of its aims is to 
manage Brazil’s natural resources along sustainable lines. At the same time, it will 
support Brazil's valuable efforts to become a major player by complying with its 
commitments under multilateral environmental agreements, in particular the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the Frame-work Convention on Climate Change 
and the Kyoto Protocol (European Commission, 2010, p. 43). 
On the other side of the aid spectrum, Brazil has also become a significant “donor,” increasingly 
since 2003, due to Lula’s foreign policy oriented to the South. The Western community views Brazil 
as a potential competitor in aid cooperation, and fears that new donors, such as Brazil, “will 
undermine the DAC consensus on good governance and aid modalities” (Humphrey, 2010). As the 
economic crisis is reducing European funds for aid, there would be more room for the emerging 
countries to contribute – Brazil, in particular, to Latin America and to some countries in Africa – 
which implement cooperation in a completely different way compared to the DAC donors. 
10 EuropeAid is the European Agency – created in 2001—in charge of applying the set of programs and projects 
of the Commission’s foreign aid which comes from the Community budget and from the European 
Development Fund (EDF), to which contribute the member states. 
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To start with, the terms are different: Brazil rejects words such as “donor” and “aid”; on the contrary 
it talks about South-South cooperation (SSC). In effect, Brazil has not accepted the OECD criteria 
as a donor – it has as a recipient – such as the tying of aid, aid conditionality, and the definition of 
aid. According to Grimm, Brazil is reluctant to participate in the traditional channels established in 
the past by the developed countries and prefers to use its own methods, based on the demand, to 
provide help to those who ask for it (Grimm et al., 2009). 
As Ayllón and Leite analyze, Brazil’s cooperation rests on the principles of solidarity and co-
responsibility. Solidarity refers to the non-commercial and non-lucrative basis of the implemented 
actions; the lack of conditionality; and the identity among the parties, which would be the basis for 
actions oriented to the common interest. Co-responsibility concerns the non-welfare and non-
paternalist character of the implemented actions. It includes the idea of autonomy through 
institutional strengthening, ownership, and accountability (2010, p. 20) 
However, it cannot be denied that Brazil links its cooperation to its foreign policy – as the EU does. 
The clash of interests between the partners is therefore unavoidable. Behind Brazil’s solidarity, there 
are several hidden aims such as the search of support for its campaign to achieve a permanent seat in 
the Security Council, or the spreading of the world production of bio-fuels and the Brazilian 
technology in the area, as well as the competition for markets.  According to Luiz Henrique Pereira 
da Fonseca, ex-director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, or Agência Brasileira de Cooperação 
(ABC), another aim would be to contribute to the stability in the region (Bruno and Costa Leite). 
From the beginning of Lula’s term to July 2010, the ABC coordinated a total number of 475 projects 
of technical cooperation and 1,014 ad hoc activities (Ayllón Pino, 2012, p. 199).  
By regions, the financial distribution was concentrated in Africa (48%, and 36 beneficiary countries), 
Latin America and the Caribbean (41%, and 30 beneficiary countries), and Asia and the Middle East 
(11%). The main sectors of action were those in which the Brazilian institution have accumulated 
more abilities and knowledge, led by agriculture (21.8%), health (16.2%), education and technical 
training (12.1%), environment (7.43%), security ( 6.2%), public administration (5.8%), and social 
development (5.3%). The beneficiary countries according to volume of financial aid received are 
Mozambique (15.7%), East Timor (15.1%), Guinea Bissau (14.4%), Haiti (13.1%), Cape Verde 
(9.7%), Paraguay (7.45%), Guatemala (6.3%), Santo Tome and Prince (6.9%), Angola (4.76%), 
Uruguay (3.26%), and Cuba (2.9%).11 
11Translation of “Por regiones, la distribución financiera de estos proyectos se concentraba en África (48% y 
36 países beneficiarios), América Latina y Caribe (41% y 30 países beneficiarios) y Asia/Oriente Medio (11%). 
Los principales sectores de actuación fueron aquellos donde las capacidades y conocimientos acumulados por 
las instituciones brasileñas son más relevantes y reconocidos, encabezados por la agricultura (21,8%), la salud 
(16,2%), la educación y capacitación técnica (12,1%), el medio ambiente (7,43%), la seguridad (6,2%), la 
administración pública (5,8%) y el desarrollo social (5,3%). En cuanto a los países destinatarios de la 
cooperación según volúmenes financieros en el período 2005-2010, se encuentran Mozambique (15,7%), Timor 
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 In spite of these differences, the EU could make the most of Brazil’s advantages in cooperation in 
order to work together in triangular projects. Ayllón and Leite point out that the common identity 
among the South countries would increase the possibilities of success in the transfer of solutions for 
development. They also refer to the fact that Brazil would not commit the same mistakes as the 
North, as it has never been a colonial power and has itself suffered interference of all kind (2010, p. 
22) which would allow it to empathize with other South countries(EurActiv, 2011).   
Secondly, Brazil shares the same problems and characteristics – climate, environment conditions, 
poverty, and culture – as the recipients, mainly LA countries, given that it is still a developing country 
which receives some cooperation aid. 
In addition, Brazil is an example of success, since in the last decade extreme poverty has been strongly 
reduced: “between 2003 and 2008, ten percent of Brazil’s population rose out of poverty; a majority 
of Brazilians now belong to the lower middle class” (Sweng, 2010). This group represents “almost 
45% of the total population, a growth of 10 percentage points in only five years” (Santiso, 2011, p. 
69). This social inclusion has been possible thanks to welfare state programs such as Bolsa Familia, 
part of the strategy known as “Zero Hunger,” which was launched by Lula in 2003, in the opening 
session of UNGA. Other countries have already imported the program.  
In this line, the EU could take advantage of Brazil’s experience and easier access to the developing 
countries when it comes to implementing projects through triangular cooperation.12Different 
declarations and communications from the EU have already pointed to this direction, proposing to 
support South-South initiatives (European Commission, 2011a), or to start triangular cooperation 
with the goal of joining forces in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, as well as to 
deal with trans-regional threats (European Commission, 2010). 
In particular, Brazil has worked successfully with different European countries, such as Germany or 
Spain, in triangular projects.13 As the Treaty of Lisbon establishes, the Commission must improve 
the coordination between the Community and the member states. Triangular cooperation projects 
could be a good starting point, given that some EU member states – such as Germany, United 
Kingdom, Italy, France, or Spain – have already cooperated in various triangular projects with Brazil. 
Oriental (15,1%), Guinea Bissau (14,4%), Haití (13,1%), Cabo Verde (9,7%), Paraguay (7,45%), Guatemala 
(6,3%), Santo Tomé y Príncipe (6,9%), Angola (4,76%), Uruguay (3,26%) y Cuba (2,9%). 
12 Triangular cooperation is a cooperation mechanism which helps the South-South cooperation, i.e. a 
traditional OCDE donor country or multilateral organism that supports cooperation programs and projects of 
two developing countries, in order to increase the scope of the actions, share experiences and public policies, 
and complement the available resources and abilities. 
13 Triangular cooperation plays an increasingly important role within Brazil’s cooperation.  For instance, in 
Haiti, Brazil works along with Canada in immunization; with Spain, in environmental recuperation and 
promotion of sustainable development of agro-forestry; with United Nation Fund for Population in fighting 
violence against women; with the World Bank, in programs of school snack and the management of solid waste; 
and with the Labor International Organization in combating child work. In Ayllón, Bruno and Iara Costa.Op. 
Cit. 
33 
                                                     
RODRÍGUEZ, Ana Isabel  2014 
In addition, the G-20 forum could serve as a space to “work hand-in-hand” with Brazil on the G-20 
development agenda (Schulz, 2011). 
The truth is that there is still much room for horizontal cooperation, and that on paper, both partners 
are willing to improve their cooperation in many fields, as their SP reflects. More specifically, the text 
includes the chapter Achieving the MDGs and promoting social cohesion and inclusion, which focuses on the 
fields of health, energy, agriculture, education, and employment. As described in Chapter 2, the two 
JAPs have solidified these goals through dialogues and actions, which facilitate the cooperation in 
every field.  
For instance, both the 2008-2011 JAP and the 2012-2014 JAP include references to the SSC and 
triangular cooperation. The European Commission emphasizes the need to intensify the cooperation 
in triangular actions in energy with African states of the Community of Portuguese Language 
Countries, or Comunidade dos Países de Lingua Portuguesa (CPLP). In addition, in 2010 Brazil and the EC 
signed a letter of intentions to cooperate in electoral process in PALOP, or African Countries of 
Portuguese Official Language.  
Despite their willingness, there are some difficulties in implementing the triangular cooperation 
between both parties. First, the European Commission has not yet designed any instrument for this 
kind of cooperation, so the recipient countries would have to consent that a part of the aid addressed 
to national or regional programs of bilateral character be redirected to the triangular projects. In 
addition, along with some problems of budget assignations and management, Brazil is reluctant to 
accept certain elements of the Aid Effectiveness Agenda which could limit its programs of 
cooperation.  For these reasons, Brazil could prefer to keep cooperating bilaterally with member 
states, since this modality is easier. 
Brazil is taking a relevant place in the field of cooperation, while the EU is suffering a strong 
economic crisis, which is provoking the reduction of its funds for cooperation. However, in a long-
term perspective, it would be imprudent to cut the aid to middle-income countries. The European 
Parliament shares this view, agreeing that the EU must not abandon any of those middle-income 
countries, even the richest among them. As Guido Van Hecken, Senior Administrator at the 
Development Committee's secretariat of the EP, states, the EU should continue to cooperate with 
those countries, although through a different perspective. Van Hecken emphasizes that the EU’s aid 
should target clear sectors such as the tax system, social protection, and measures to diminish 
inequality, as well as strengthen good governance, mainly through supporting civil society, NGOs, 
etc. 
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Table 2 
TRIANGULAR COOPERATION between BRAZIL and MEMBER STATES 
Member State Area of cooperation Third country 
Germany Technical normalization, fight against 
AIDS 
Ten African and Latin 
American countries 
Spain Technical cooperation, humanitarian aid --   
especially distribution of food 
Haiti, Honduras, Cuba, 
Bolivia, Zimbabwe, Sudan, 
Mozambique, Somalia.  
France Decentralized triangular cooperation in 
local governance, agriculture, food 
security, basic health, environment, 
infrastructure, and urbanization 
Still without allocating. 
Target: Haiti and the 
African continent. 
United 
Kingdom 
Social development and fight against 
poverty through conditioned income 
transfer programs  
African countries 
Source: Bruno Ayllón (2012). 
In Brazil’s case, the country is still economically, politically, and socially vulnerable, due to factors 
such as enormous poverty and the great uneven distribution of wealth; a weak political institutional 
system, involving continual corruption cases; or a mediocre system of higher education. From a point 
of self-interest, the EU should keep close to Brazil while the LA country is still developing in order 
to gain a prestigious position as a peer, rather than a “father,” and to prevent China and the US from 
gaining space at its expense.   
In a world as uncertain as today’s, the EU cannot afford to fail in strengthening its relations with the 
countries that would seem to dominate the international scenario. Western consensus on cooperation 
was designed in the specific context of the 1990s, characterized by the end of the Cold War division 
and the emergence of a unipolar world, unlike the current multi-polar and globalized world, which 
sees a growing global volatility as a result of economic instability and increasing scarcity of key 
resources (Grimm et al., 2009)14.  
The EU must update its strategy with a new agenda, one that is not based only on cuts, but also on 
different approaches, from a horizontal perspective which includes the exchange of knowledge, 
14 Grimm, Sven, et al. Op. Cit.  
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shares successful experiences of each region, and explores complementary ways of cooperation to 
boost their respective strengths. 
Conclusions 
The reconfiguration of the global order brings challenges and opportunities that the EU and 
Brazil have to deal with. Their relations are influenced by the new characteristics of their external 
actions, given that each partner is reconfiguring its foreign policy to fit in the new order. Although 
with some nuances, the former president of Brazil, Lula da Silva, and the current, Dilma Rousseff, 
have share the idea of a foreign policy oriented to the South and the emerging powers as a means to 
form stronger South blocs to defy the established imbalanced global order.  
In this sense, Brazil sees the BRIC forum as a platform to promote its goals, which are mainly a seat 
in the United Nations Security Council and a fair representation within other international 
institutions, such as the IMF and the WB. In addition, Brazil and the rest of the BRIC pursue better 
economic governance and a more stable and diversified monetary system. Those aims imply a zero-
sum game since the gains of Brazil signifies the losses for the EU to a certain extent, as in the case of 
the recent redistribution of power shares in the IMF and the WB, or the establishment of the G-20 
as the economic forum for a better governance, in which the power is more diluted than in a G-7 
forum, although in this latter European countries hold the power instead of the EU as a bloc.   
However, the BRIC represents a relative challenge for the EU since that forum is not a cohesive and 
coordinated institution; rather it is a group of countries with very different interests in and 
perceptions of the global order, and in the way to achieve a more balance system. All the same, 
although slowly, the redistribution of power is taking place and the EU and Brazil are fighting for the 
biggest piece.  
In the same line, Brazil also utilizes its region as a platform for major international visibility. The 
South American country is behind some regional integration processes, such as UNASUR or 
CELAC, which pursue more political cooperation, physical and energetic integration, and social 
cohesion. The political logic of the new regionalism differs from the open-regionalism of the 1990’s, 
based on economic integration, which had been supported unconditionally by the EU.  
Accordingly, the new regional context represents a challenge for the EU which should update its 
traditional model of relations with the region. Brazil, as part of South America and the driving force 
of the new regionalism, is a key element that the EU should take into account when redefining its 
approach. The more horizontal and less paternalist model of relations claimed by Brazil could fit for 
the whole region. Other related issue, which the project does not covers, is whether it should be a 
bilateral or a bi-regional strategy.  
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Second, in a changing world with new emerging powers and the traditional ones hardly beaten by the 
current economic crisis, the field of cooperation for development is also suffering deep changes due 
to the drop of resources provided by the Western countries and the existence of new donors, such 
as Brazil, which contest the traditional OECD cooperation system and which prefers to use its own 
methods, based on demand and without conditionality.  
Traditionally, Brazil has been an aid recipient and the EU, the biggest donor in the world, summing 
up the contributions of the members states and the EU together. The new EU agenda on cooperation 
seeks more efficiency on the spending, concentrating the assistance in the poorer countries. In 
addition, the Arab spring has captured EU’s attention, occupying one of its priorities in cooperation, 
as well as in humanitarian aid, in order to assure a stable and reliable neighborhood.  As a result, the 
EC may reduce significantly the resources given to the upper middle income countries, such as Brazil. 
Meanwhile Brazil is taking room in this field, placing itself as a leader of South-South cooperation, 
mainly in Africa and also in Latin America, both for interest, pursuing international prestige, and for 
solidarity. 
However, despite of their different perspectives in the field of cooperation, the Western consensus 
vs. the South-South cooperation, there is space for collaboration through triangular projects, 
complementing their resources and abilities to assist a less developing country. In fact, this is one of 
the areas included in the first Joint Action Plan (JAP) of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership which 
have gained more relevance in the second JAP.  
In those terms, the structural changes in the international system are urging the EU and Brazil to 
redefine its strategies for consolidation and configuration of their leader roles in global arenas. 
However, although this search for a new space seems a zero-sum game of power struggle, their 
economic interdependence as well as other security challenges results in the search of more political 
cooperation in the multilateral foro and through bilateral agreements such as the SP. It can be 
affirmed that the structural character of EU-Brazil relations remain despite some temporary factors, 
such as the change of government, the reform of the EU treaties, or even the international crisis. 
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